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While governments often wish to restrict certain goods from crossing borders, their means and will 
are often insufficient to discourage business minded traders.  Smuggling is thus prevalent and can 
result in violence, corruption, distorted competition and loss of tariff revenue (see Naim 2005 and 
Fisman and Wei 2004).  
In China smuggling is a severe problem authorities have been trying to tackle for many years. 
According to the General Administration of Customs, customs and police departments have 
prosecuted more than 90,000 smuggling cases involving goods worth $24.2 billion from 1999 to 
2004. But much of it remains undetected. According to the same report, smugglers have become 
shrewder and that poses new challenges (Xinhua News Agency 2004). This paper aims at shedding 
more light on the determinants of this underground activity. 
Recent research (Fisman and Wei 2004, 2009) used discrepancies in official trade statistics to detect 
smuggling, asserting that imports or exports missing from one country’s reports may have been 
smuggled, misreported or underinvoiced, as noted by Bhagwati (1964). They found that high tariffs 
and corrupt environments make smuggling more likely.  In this paper we argue that another crucial 
ingredient for smuggling to occur is international networks. Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed that 
ethnic Chinese networks, notably through interpersonal relationships known as guanxi, could act as 
trade catalysts by enforcing contracts and providing market information. As smuggling occurs 
outside the law, market information is hard to find and trust is all the more important to overcome 
hold-up problems (see Marcouiller 2000). Overseas Chinese networks should hence increase tariff 
evasion in Chinese trade.  
We test this prediction by combining the analysis of Fisman and Wei (2004) with that of Rauch and 
Trindade (2002). More precisely, we show that the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports, 
i.e. the log difference of exports reported by exporting countries and imports reported by China, 
increases significantly in the number of overseas Chinese in the exporting country. This result holds 
under various specifications, different periods and various indicators of Chinese networks. We also  
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find that Chinese networks help tariff evasion in their host countries, and that this effect is highest 
in corrupt countries.  
As some may argue that the gap in trade values is too noisy of a measure to capture smuggling, we 
show that the results also hold when missing imports are measured in quantities. Moreover, we find 
that, while tariff evasion is more pronounced in differentiated products (as classified by Rauch 
1999), Chinese networks appear more useful in evading tariffs when it is hardest, i.e. for non-
differentiated goods. 
To show that our results are not due to luck or an omitted variable bias, we run placebo tests 
interacting tariff with country characteristics that may be correlated with Chinese immigration, such 
as GDP, distance to China, and trade with China. We find that contiguity and corruption do increase 
tariff evasion but that the interaction with Chinese networks is robust, losing significance in only 
one case out of twelve, probably due to collinearity.  
We also estimate our model for four Southeast Asian countries and find some evidence, though less 
robust, of an Indonesian and a Philippine network, suggesting the results may not be specific to 
overseas Chinese.  
To check whether tariff evasion occurs through misreporting, i.e. the declaration of imports as 
similar goods with lower tariffs, we follow Fisman and Wei (2004) and include the average tariff on 
similar goods in our model and also add its interaction with the tariff spread within similar product 
categories. In partner countries, we find evidence of Chinese networks and corruption increasing 
misreporting, but only when the tariff spread is of at least 10 percentage points.  
In the next section we review the literature. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.  Section 3 





                                                
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The idea that discrepancy in trade statistics could be attributed to smuggling dates back to Bhagwati 
(1964). In theory, what one country reports as imports should be equal to what its partner reports as 
exports, (or plus cost of freight and insurance (cif) if values are reported, rather than quantities). In 
practice, this is rarely the case. Smuggling may be one of the reasons. Goods may be undervalued or 
misreported, often with the complicity of customs officials who may take a bribe rather than impose 
a barrier, or, they can enter or leave a country circumventing customs altogether, hence appearing 
only on one side.   
Fisman and Wei (2004) looked at the missing trade between Hong Kong and China. They found 
that an increase in tariff (plus VAT) of one percentage point resulted in a 3% increase in evasion
2. 
They also argued that tariff evasion happened through misreporting in similar categories. For 
example, frozen chicken breasts are passed as turkeys’ to avoid high tariffs (Fisman and Miguel 
2008). Javorcik and Narciso (2008) confirmed the tariff evasion result, using data on trade between 
Germany and 10 Eastern European countries. They also argued that a higher level of product 
differentiation increases tariff evasion as it increases the difficulty in ascertaining prices and 
classifications, and hence in detecting misreporting or under-invoicing. Mishra, Subramanian and 
Topalova (2008) confirmed these tariff evasion results for India and found higher tariff semi-
elasticity of missing imports in those products where enforcement of customs law, proxied by the 
mode of entry, was laxer. More recently many studies have confirmed the tariff evasion result for 
various African countries (Arndt & Van Dunem 2006, Bouet & Roy 2009, Levin & Widell 2007), 
North America (Stoyanov 2009), Brazil (Kume et al. 2010), and for a cross section of 74 countries 
(Jean & Mitaritonna 2010).  
Yet very little research has gone further to identify the determinants of tariff evasion beyond high 
tariffs and corruption. Two notable exceptions are Yang (2008), who studied the effect of customs 
 
2 In different specifications of their benchmark regression, the tariff semi-elasticity varies from 2.46% to 3.57%.  
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reforms on tariff evasion in the Philippines, and Anson et al. (2006), who examined whether pre-
shipment inspection in Indonesia, the Philippines and Argentina were effective in decreasing tariff 
evasion. Both pre-shipment inspection schemes and customs reforms had mixed results. Fisman, 
Moustatersky and Wei (2008) is the only paper that underlined the role of experts’ knowledge in 
facilitating smuggling. They provided evidence that indirect trade through Hong Kong’s 
warehouses, which involves agents specialized in processing and distribution, is also a tariff evasion 
process.  
Another branch of international trade focuses on the role of migrant networks in facilitating trade. 
Greif (1993) pioneered this field studying how Maghribi trading networks of the 11
th century could 
promote trade by providing community enforcement of sanctions that deter violations of contracts. 
Similarly, Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed that ethnic Chinese trade networks help to match 
buyers and sellers in the international marketplace by providing market information and enforcing 
contracts. Moreover, Dunlevy (2006) found that migrant networks were most important for trade in 
corrupt environments, where trust is most necessary. These mechanisms should hence also be at 
work for tariff evasion and might have even stronger impacts. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are at least two reasons why migrant networks should also be at work for illicit trade and 
might have even stronger impacts than on legal trade. The first is that trade matching in an 
underground activity is even more complicated. Market information does not flow freely and this 
makes it difficult to learn about illegal and highly profitable opportunities. Overseas Chinese may 
know exactly which businessmen are ready to engage in tariff evasion transactions and which 
varieties are in supply and demand in both China and their host countries. As Kotkin (1992) states,  
“Chinese entrepreneurs remain, in essence, arbitrageurs, their widespread dispersion a critical 
means of identifying prime business opportunities” (cited in Rauch and Trindade 2002). Besides  
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information about the structure of the market, they may know which customs agents are corrupt, 
both in China and in their host country, and thus smooth the process of bribery.  
Second, the total absence of a legal contract enforcement mechanism makes trust enhancement 
crucial for traders wishing to evade tariffs. For instance, when tariff evasion takes place through 
double invoicing, exporters send an “informal” invoice directly to the importers indicating the true 
value of the shipment, while another “official” invoice that undervalues the goods and accompanies 
these through customs. Enforcing payment of the “informal” invoice can only be done outside the 
law, rendering trust the most important.  Trust was found to be most important for trade when 
formal institutions are absent and in corrupt environments (Dunlevy 2006). Chinese networks 
provide this trust notably through interpersonal relationships known as guanxi formed by members 
with a common background. Lee (2010) states that, in China, a guanxi based on loyalty “may be 
crucial in determining business successes or at least in pursuing business opportunities since the 
rules of law have long been absent for the protection of private property rights and economic 
interests”.  
One way to think about the role of networks in tariff evasion is the tariff evasion model of Mishra et 
al. (2008) who draw from the literature on tax evasion (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2000). In their 
model, an importer faces a cost of evasion that increases in the quality of enforcement and a given 
increase in tariff has a lower impact on evasion the better the quality of custom enforcement. We 
can extend their logic by adding in the cost of evasion a probability of getting caught that 
diminishes with Chinese networks. The idea is that it is less risky to do business with overseas 
Chinese who are more trustworthy, know which customs agents are corrupt, know how to package 
the goods to disguise them and how to fill export declarations appropriately, and are hence less 
likely to “mess up” the trade. Indeed, an OECD report (2009) on modus operandi of foreign bribery 
through intermediaries explains how, when family, friends and other third persons act as 
intermediaries, “the principal company knows the identity of the foreign public official who receives  
 
7
                                                
the bribe”. It can then be shown that a decrease in the probability of getting caught increases the 
tariff elasticity of evasion. 
Another way to look at this is to think of illicit trade as a matching process à la Rauch and Casella 
(2002). In their model, a successful match is seen as a joint venture between partners in both 
countries who share profits equally. But some matches are unsuccessful as ex ante information is 
insufficient for all matches to be profitable. A subset of individuals, i.e. the migrants network, has 
more information about opportunities abroad and hence benefits from these ties to achieve a higher 
level of profitability in international trade. We can think of tariff evasion as a process only members 
of the migrant network know ex ante and which makes trade more profitable. Hence tariff evasion 
should increase with group ties. 
In summary, these theoretical explanations imply Chinese networks play a facilitating role in tariff 
evasion in trade with China. This occurs through the provision of market information, informal 
contract enforcement and the smoothing of bribery at borders. The empirical analysis aims at testing 
this prediction.    
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
We use 2005 trade data from Comtrade to compute, for each HS6 product (about 5000 products) 
and around 160 trade partners, missing imports as log (1+exports to China declared by exporting 
countries) – log (1+imports declared by China). We use both values and quantity data
3. We dropped 
from our dataset all countries that did not report any exports (and any imports when testing the 
prediction on the partners’ side). A list of remaining countries is in the appendix. 
We use applied tariff data from TRAINS (simple averages)
4, corruption data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank and population data, to calculate Chinese networks as a 
share of total population, from CEPII. Data on overseas Ethnic Chinese, i.e. foreign born migrants 
 
3 We replace missing trade values and quantities with zeros when one side was reporting. For quantities we use all 
reported quantities except when reported units do not match.  
4 The applied MFN tariffs and the effectively applied tariffs coincide in the case of China since the country was not part 
of any trade agreements in 2005.  
 
8
                                                
from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, are from the Global Migrant Origin Database, which 
extends the UN migrants stock data based on the 2000 round of censuses (i.e., taken between 1995 
and 2004; see Parsons et al. (2007) for a detailed description) 
5. Summary statistics are in Table 1. 
Table 1 
We use 2005 tariff and trade data for two main reasons. The first is that it maximises data 
availability. The second is that, as explained by Ahn et al. (2010), by 2005, any Chinese firm that 
wished to directly trade with foreign partners was free to do so, as WTO accession in 2001 implied 
a progressive removal of trading license and firm size requirements. This freedom to trade for all 
businesses should increase the relevance of overseas networks.  
It is important to note that missing trade is a noisy measure that captures much more than 
smuggling activities. Import values include cost-insurance and freight (cif) costs whereas export 
values are free on board (fob), so the difference in reports also include some trade costs. It may also 
be noisy because of exchange rates miscalculations, lax custom statisticians and indirect trade 
confusing reports. Nitsch (2009) discusses in detail the various reasons for discrepancies in bilateral 
trade statistics. Still, as Fisman (2009) reminds us, while the trade gap cannot be used to quantify 
smuggling precisely, it is still relevant to identify correlation patterns and uncover the causes of 
illicit flows. Without a doubt, asymmetric trade policies such as tariffs allow us to observe 
smuggling in missing trade. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Missing trade is white noise when there 
are no trade barriers. But when imports restrictions are high, i.e. when their tariff is above the 95
th 
percentile (20%), missing imports are almost strictly positive, in other words, missing from the 
importer’s reports. In the appendix we provide the values of missing imports by partner country and 
at the two levels of tariffs. In more than 75% of the cases, missing import values are greater when 
tariffs are high. 
Figure 1 
 
5 Where foreign-born data are not available the database uses the foreign nationality criterion.   
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Before testing our main prediction, we estimate the effect of tariffs on Chinese, as well as four 
southeast Asian, missing imports, i.e., using the following model
6: 
(1)   missing  importsik = αi  + β tariffik +εik  
where αi is a partner fixed effect and k is a product (HS6-digit tariff line) indicator. Table 2 
summarizes the results. We find that a 10 percentage point increase in tariff increases missing 
imports by about 32%, which is very close to the 30% estimated by Fisman and Wei (2004) for 
trade with Hong Kong.  This effect is more than twice as high as in Southeast Asia, where it lies 
around 13%. 
Table 2 
We then estimate the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports per partner country, dropping 
countries with too few observations (less than 70), and plot it against the size of the overseas 
Chinese community (Figure 2). We find a positive relationship suggesting migrant networks may 
increase tariff evasion
7. We investigate this further in the next section. 
Figure 2 
IV. CHINESE NETWORKS AND ILLICIT TRADE 
To examine the role of migrant networks more carefully we interact the migrant network variable 
with tariffs and estimate:  
(2)   missing  importsik = αi  + β1 tariffik + β2 (tariffik * log (1 + Chinesei)) +εik 
We also estimate the model using Chinese migrants’ share of population instead of the size of the 
Chinese community. As suggested by Rauch and Trindade (2002), the number of Chinese migrants 
may indicate the number of potential Chinese connections with the partner country, while the share 
 
6 Besides import tariffs, VAT rates can create incentives to underreport imports. China’s VAT rates vary from 13% to 
17% (besides exemptions). In their paper on tariff evasion in trade between Hong Kong and China, Fisman and Wei 
(2004) add VAT rates to import tariffs at the HS8-digit level, but they report that their results are unchanged if VAT 
rates are dropped.. 
7Plotting Chinese migrants as a share of the total partner’s population on the horizontal axis does not alter the figure. 
Furthermore, a similar, though less pronounced, figure is found using quantities instead of values.  
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of the country’s population may proxy the probability of picking a Chinese business partner in the 
foreign country. Results are in Table 3. For both values and quantities we find evidence of a 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of Chinese networks and tariffs, which also 
holds when including partner-industry (HS4) fixed effects (not shown). This confirms our 
prediction that Chinese networks increase tariff evasion. We also adopted a specification with 
product and partner fixed effects, controlling for all product and partner level characteristics. The 
coefficient on the interaction term remains positive and significant, though at the 11% level for 
values.  
Table 3 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of column (1) in Table 3, showing how the effect of tariff on 
missing imports increases as the ethnic Chinese overseas population increases. In trade with the US, 
where there is more than 1.5 million Chinese-born, an increase in tariff from 10% to 20% would 
increase the value of missing imports by almost 40%. However, in trade with France, where only 
about 40,000 Chinese migrants live, the same tariff change would increase evasion by less than 
25%.    
Figure 3 
We also estimate the same regression for four Southeast Asian countries. We find a positive and 
significant effect of migrant networks on tariff evasion for Indonesia and the Philippines, suggesting 
the results may not be specific to overseas Chinese (Table 4). But these become insignificant when 
quantities are used instead of values and when we include partner and product fixed effects (results 
not shown). This indicates that overseas Chinese may be exceptional and may also contribute to 
tariff evasion in Southeast Asian countries, where Chinese communities are large and usually 
involved in business (Rauch and Trindade 2002). We thus run the same regression adding overseas 
Chinese populations in the Southeast Asian regression. A positive coefficient would suggest that, 
for example, Indonesia’s tariff evasion increases on imports from countries with large Chinese  
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communities. As seen in Table 5, this is not the case. We find no indication that international 
Chinese networks play a role in tariff evasion in any of the four Southeast Asian countries. This 
could suggest Chinese networks provide market information mostly about Chinese smuggling 
opportunities. .  
Table 4 and 5 
A possible concern about our estimation is that the results are just applicable to a specific time 
period. To check for this possibility, we use the data on overseas Chinese population from Rauch 
and Trindade (2002) that refers to a period around 1990. Therefore, trade and tariff data are from 
1994 (previous years have very little Chinese data)
8. As reported in Table 6, the main result still 
holds, as the interaction of tariff and Chinese is significant at the 99% level, despite the more 
limited coverage of the Rauch and Trindade (2002) dataset on ethnic Chinese (only data 43 
countries could be used in the estimation)
9.  
Table 6 
As overseas Chinese could be capturing other country characteristics or bilateral affinity that could 
affect tariff evasion in China, we run placebo tests interacting tariff with the logs of GDP, GDP per 
capita, total bilateral trade, distance, with a measure of corruption and a shared border dummy. The 
results are in table 7. Only the interactions with border and corruption show up positive and 
significant, and that only for quantities. The interaction of tariff with Chinese network loses 
significance only in two cases out of fourteen, i.e. when trade is included in the missing values 
regression. This may be because of too high collinearity, as the correlation between the interaction 
of tariff with trade and the interaction of tariff with Chinese is higher than 95%. But when looking 
at missing quantities, the coefficient on the interaction of tariff and Chinese networks remains 
 
8 The correlation between the logs of Chinese in circa 1990 and circa 2000 is 0.61. 
9 We also run a specification in first-difference, but failed to find a statistically significant correlation between the 
difference in missing imports and the difference in applied tariff in 2005 and 1994 (after having ensured that both data 
were classified according to the HS1992 system).   
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significant. Overall, these tests suggest that the effect of Chinese networks on tariff evasion is not 
channelled through other partner country characteristics related to trade or development.  
Table 7 
Different modes of tariff evasion 
To take our analysis further, we examine whether tariff evasion occurs through misreporting in 
similar categories or simply through underinvoicing and if Chinese networks have different effects 
on these practices. As FedEx warns on its website (2010), in China, “customs officials still have 
wide discretion concerning the category in which an import is placed [and have] the flexibility […] 
to "negotiate" duties.” Tariff dodgers could be declaring imports under a “wrong” product category 
with a lower tariff, and this with the consent of corrupt customs officials. As outlined above, 
Chinese migrants might know how to package the goods to disguise them and how to fill export 
declarations appropriately to smooth the misreporting process.    
We explore this possibility by firstly replicating the tests of Fisman and Wei (2004) who include the 
average tariff on similar goods (within the same HS4 category) on the right hand side of our 
benchmark regression model (equation (1)) to capture incentives to misclassify imports
10. The idea 
is that the lower the average tariff on similar products; the higher will be the amount of misreported 
imports, and hence the higher the missing imports. A negative and significant coefficient on the 
average tariff on similar products would thus provide evidence of tariff evasion through 
misreporting. As seen in columns (1) and (4) of table 8 and unlike Fisman and Wei (2004), we first 
do not find any evidence of misreporting as the coefficient on tariffs on similar goods is positive 
and significant. This is in line with Javorcik and Narciso (2008) who find insignificant coefficients 
on misreporting. However, misreporting may depend on the tariff spread between similar goods. 
The lower is the tariff on similar goods and the higher is the tariff dispersion, the higher the 
 
10 In their paper, Fisman and Wei (2004) use a weighted average tariff on similar products, with the export values as 
weights. Their (implicit) assumption is that exports are reported truthfully. This assumption becomes more problematic 
in our setting with a cross-section of exporters. We nevertheless ran the misreporting tests also with the weighted 
average in both values and quantities (results not reported) and find similar results.  
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incentives for misreporting. To test for this, we interact tariff on similar goods with the spread of 
tariffs within HS4 categories. For quantities, we find a negative and significant coefficient on this 
interaction suggesting misreporting may occur but only when the tariff spread is of at least 15 
percentage points, which represent few cases
11. We then investigate whether Chinese networks 
increase the misreporting results but do not find any such evidence (results not reported). 
Table 8 
This test cannot however capture all types of misreporting. Misreporting may occur in similar goods 
at the 6 digit level, or in any type of service. For example, a portion of the true value of chicken 
imports might be declared as marketing services. We leave these questions to further research as our 
data does not allow computing average tariffs of similar products within 6-digit categories and does 
not cover trade in services. 
Finally, as both Javorcik and Narciso (2008) and Mishra et al. (2008) argue that a higher level of 
product differentiation increases tariff evasion due to a greater difficulty in ascertaining product 
price and hence in detecting false reports, we check if this is also the case for Chinese tariff evasion. 
We use the Rauch (1999) classification and identify products as non-differentiated when both the 
liberal and conservative classifications indicate that the product is either traded on organized 
markets or listed in trade publications. Results in table 9 indicate that, as found by previous 
research, for both values and quantities, a higher degree of product differentiation increases the 
tariff semi-elasticity of missing imports, hence tariff evasion. However, product differentiation 
decreases the role of Chinese networks as the coefficient on the interaction of Chinese networks, 
tariff and the non-differentiated dummy is positive and significant. This result is robust to the 
inclusion of product and partner fixed effects. This suggests Chinese networks are all the more 
necessary when evasion is hardest, i.e. for homogenous commodities.  
 
11 Less than 3% of the “partner country-HS4” observations have a tariff spread larger than 15%. Following the same 
logic, we use the tariff deviation from the average tariff on similar products (within the same HS4 category) as a 
measure of misreporting incentives. In presence of misclassification, high deviation should lead to high missing 





Tariff evasion in partner countries 
We now look at tariff evasion in partner countries, verifying whether the results hold when looking 
at missing imports from China. Anecdotal evidence suggests this might indeed by the case. In a 
recent New York Times report, Donadio (2010) writes about the Chinese network in Prato, Italy: 
With its bureaucracy, protectionist policies and organized crime, Italy is arguably 
Western Europe’s least business-friendly country. Yet in Prato, the Chinese have 
managed to create an entirely new economy from scratch in a matter of years… But 
what seems to gall some Italians most is that the Chinese are beating them at their own 
game — tax evasion and brilliant ways of navigating Italy’s notoriously complex 
bureaucracy — and have created a thriving, if largely underground, new sector. 
Here, the missing import variable is the log difference between exports reported by China and 
imports reported by partner countries. The tariffs are those imposed on Chinese imports in partner 
countries. We also add corruption to the specification, as it varies across countries and should affect 
the tariff elasticity of missing imports as it might create a more “smuggling-friendly” environment. 
Tariff dodgers are more likely to escape legal penalties in corrupt countries where customs officials 
are more inclined to take the bribe than to enforce the law. Results are in table 10.  
Table 10 
Again we find evidence, for both values and quantities, that Chinese communities increase tariff 
evasion on goods that come from China. While their expertise is found to be most useful in the most 
corrupt countries, it remains so in countries with moderate levels of corruption. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4, which shows how the effect of tariff on missing imports is highest when corruption is high 
and when Chinese communities are biggest. The statistical significance of the coefficients can be 
verified in the lower panel. This result confirms the theoretical prediction on the role of the 
interaction between network communities and high corruption in lowering the probability of being 
caught.  
Figure 4  
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We also carry out misreporting tests and get similar results as the interaction of average tariff on 
similar goods with the tariff spread is again negative and significant (columns 2 and 5 of table 11). 
Strong evidence of misreporting emerges for tariff evasion in quantities, as the marginal effect of 
the average tariff on similar goods is negative for all tariff spreads. What’s more, we here find that 
misreporting might be at its highest not only when the tariff spread is high but also when corruption 
and Chinese networks are big (last row of table 11), suggesting the latter play a role in tariff evasion 
through misreporting. This fits well with anecdotal evidence from the Philippines where imports of 
white rice, which normally require an import license and are subject to a 50% duty and 12% VAT, 
have been misreported as mung beans, zero-rated under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer 2010). 
Table 11 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper argues that a crucial ingredient for smuggling to occur is the presence of international 
networks. As tariff evasion occurs outside the law, market information is scant and formal 
institutions inexistent, rendering networks the more important. Combining the analysis of Fisman 
and Wei (2004) with that of Rauch and Trindade (2002), we find strong evidence that international 
Chinese networks, proxied by ethnic Chinese migrant populations, play a role in tariff evasion in 
Chinese trade. More precisely, we show that the tariff semi-elasticity of Chinese missing imports 
(and missing imports from China) increases significantly in the number of overseas Chinese in the 
trade partner. Our baseline estimates suggest that a 10% increase in 2005 import tariffs by China 
would have increased tariff evasion by 25% in countries like France with around 40,000 Chinese-
born migrants, while it would have led to a 40% increase in countries with much larger Chinese 
communities like the US (about 1.5 million Chinese migrants). We suggest the effects takes place 
through matching of illicit-minded traders, identification of corrupt customs agents and enforcement 
of informal contracts. The role of corruption is confirmed by the tariff evasion regression in China’s  
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trade partners where a combination of high corruption and large Chinese communities maximizes 
tariff evasion. 
While this paper provides evidence of widespread tariff evasion through underinvoicing and 
sometimes, misreporting in similar goods, tariff evasion can take many other forms, such as 
transhipment via third countries and misreporting of goods as services, where networks might play 
even stronger roles. Identifying these practices, as well as disentangling the information and trust 
channels, makes for promising future research.    
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Chinese missing imports 
export_value  90822  4063.568 10.425  61449.26  0 8220975 
import_value  90822 5394.819 44.6685  81955.29  0  9691029 
missing_import_value  90822 -0.96651  -0.56361 2.392711 -15.485 11.21912 
export_quantity  90404 7302144  166.5 5.10E+08  0 1.17E+11 
import_quantity  90404 9578847  2075 4.96E+08  0 1.11E+11 
missing_ import_ qty  90404 -2.30187  -1.33947 4.415649  -23.3962 17.03606 
China tariff  90822 9.316977  8.5  6.077339  0  65 
Partners’ missing imports 
export_value  254614 2575.408 22.3255  52404.12  0  8777217 
import_value  254619 3485.119  48.661  64221.57  0 1.13E+07 
missing_import_value  254614 -0.71904  -0.50501 2.133677  -12.4739 11.87726 
export_quantity  248870 5638173  3795 1.55E+09  0 7.71E+11 
import_quantity  250342 3344950  7684 6.13E+08  0 3.00E+11 
missing_ import_ qty  248812 -1.36066  -0.59695 4.725222  -26.4271 22.99488 
Partner tariff  254619 8.731757  5  10.53337  0  991.49 
Chinese immigrants and corruption 
Chinese  144 48130.26  1152 2.38E+05  0 2.27E+06 
Chinese share  141  0.004214  0.000169 0.029146  0 0.340163 
corruption  141 -0.13928  0.177225  0.9881  -2.52976 1.385773 
Summary statistics are computed on the datasets that are used for the main estimations. Statistics for Chinese, 




Table 2. Effect of tariffs on missing import values 
  China  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand    
Tariff  .0321*** .0137*** .0142*** .0113*** .0129*** 
  (.00231) (.00177) (.00160) (.00347) (.00093) 
Obs  90822 46448 59754 40041 76597 
R2  0.047 0.088 0.191 0.113 0.124 
Partner fixed effects (least square dummy varibles - LSDV) regressions. Standard errors 




Table 3. The role of Chinese networks in tariff evasion in China 
  Missing imports values  Missing import quantities 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Tariff  .00740    .0454***   .000665   .0587***   
  (.0066)   (.0053)   (.0159)    (.0100)   
Tariff × Chinese  .00239***  .000951
†     .00346***  .00227**     
 (.0006)  (.0006)      (.0013)  (.0011)     
Tariff × Chinese share      .00183***  .000879      .00293**  .00237* 
     (.0007)  (.0007)      (.0014)  (.0012) 
Obs  90822 90822  87022 86896  90404  90285  86613  86486 
R2  0.048 0.000  0.049 0.000  0.069  0.0001  0.072  0.0001 
Fixed effects  partner  partner, 
product   Partner  partner, 
product  partner  partner, 
product   partner  partner, 
product  
Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
† indicates a p-value of 0.106. 
All partner FE regressions are estimated through least square dummy variable (LSDV). Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are 




Table 4. Effect of migrant networks on tariff evasion 
 China  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Tariff .00740  -.0124**  .0147***  -.00235  .0242*** 
 (.0066)  (.00497)  (.00417)  (.00896)  (.00248) 
Tariff × migrants  .00239***  .00345***  -6.41e-05  .00136*  -.00137*** 
 (.0006)  (.000649)  (.000417)  (.000823)  (.000256) 
Obs 90822  46328  59746  40037  76589 
R2 0.048  0.087  0.191  0.113  0.125 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * 






Table 5. Effect of migrant and Chinese network on tariff evasion 
 China  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Tariff .00740  .0132  .0146***  .00492  .0234*** 
 (.0066)  (.0118)  (.00565)  (.0108)  (.00332) 
Tariff × Chinese  .00239***  -.00244**  2.08e-05  -.00127  .000151 
 (.0006)  (.00105)  (.000580)  (.00109)  (.000309) 
Tariff × migrants    .00379***  -7.63e-05  .00204**  -.00145*** 
   (.00112)  (.000517)  (.001000)  (.000281) 
Obs 90822  46206  59741  40036  76588 
R2 0.048  0.086  0.191  0.113  0.125 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote 




Table 6. Effect of Chinese networks on tariff evasion – 1994 vs. 2005 
  Missing imports values  Missing imports quantities 
 2005  1994  2005 1994 
Tariff .00740  0.00315  .000665  -0.0390*** 
 (.0066)  (0.0025)  (.0159)  (0.0104) 
Tariff × Chinese in 2000  .00239***    .00346***   
 (.0006)    (.0013)   
Tariff × Chinese in 1990    0.000577***    0.00318*** 
   (0.0002)    (0.0007) 
Obs 90822  48160  90404  47132 
R2 0.048  0.044  0.069  0.088 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote 













 Table 7. The role of GDP, GDPPC, distance, contiguity, corruption and trade in tariff evasion in China 
  Missing imports values  Missing import quantities 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
Tariff .0314  .0200  .0104  .00786  .00701  .00492  .0143  .149***  .0494*  .0164  .00277  -.000806  .0318  .0905 
 (.0284)  (.0140)  (.00887)  (.00668)  (.00658)  (.0096)  (.0381)  (.0512)  (.0262)  (.0186)  (.0159)  (.0158)  (.0229)  (.0660) 
Tariff   .00245***  .00226***  .00233***  .00230***  .00256***  .00107  .000175  .00490***  .00315**  .00317**  .00309**  .00407***  .00532*** .00444** 
× Chinese  (.00079)  (.00065)  (.00062)  (.00062)  (.00060)  (.00104)  (.00112)  (.0016)  (.0014)  (.00132)  (.00132)  (.00130)  (.0019)  (.00209) 
Tariff -.000897            -.00418**  -.0060***            -.00637** 
× GDP  (.0012)            (.00181)  (.00204)            (.00324) 
Tariff     -.00111          4.15e-05    -.00453*          .00104 
× GDPPC    (.0014)          (.00273)    (.00233)          (.00475) 
Tariff       -.000301        .00693**      -.00161        .00559 
× distance      (.00056)        (.00274)      (.00105)        (.00515) 
Tariff         .00441      .0572**        .0200**      .0558 
× border        (.00504)      (.0232)        (.00938)      (.0441) 
Tariff           .00146    .00140          .00484*    .00371 
× corruption          (.00166)    (.00313)          (.00287)    (.00550) 
Tariff             .00175  .00723***            -.00503*  .00179 
× trade            (.0015)  (.00240)            (.00296)  (.00463) 
Obs. 86977  86977  90822  90822  90802  86970  86937  86568  86568  90404  90404  90384  86562  86529 
R2 0.049  0.049  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.049  0.049  0.072  0.071  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.072  0.071 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. All country-level variables except border and corruption are in natural logarithm. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 






 Table 8. Misreporting tests for tariff evasion in China 
  Missing import values  Missing import quantities 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Tariff  .0165*** .0143***  .00769  -.0105 
  (.0043) (.0044) (.0096)  (.0101) 
Avg. tariff on similar goods  .0218*** .0248*** .0376***  .0670*** 
  (.0044) (.0056) (.0102)  (.0132) 
HS4 tariff spread    .0139**   .112*** 
   (.0065)   (.0159) 
Avg. tariff on similar goods ×    -.000588  -.00533*** 
HS4 tariff spread   (.00044)   (.0011) 
Obs.  75554 75554 75266  75266 
R2  0.052 0.052 0.071  0.075 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level Table 9. Product differentiation and tariff evasion in China 
  Missing import values  Missing import quantities 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Tariff .0325***  .0491***    .0436***  .108***   
 (.00281)  (.0142)    (.00608)  (.0224)   
Non-differentiated .00242***  .00982***    .0112***  .0301***   
 (.000271)  (.00135)    (.000547)  (.00281)   
Tariff × non-differentiated  -3.37e-05*  -.000468***    -.000221***  -.00117***   
 (1.84e-05)  (.000123)    (3.36e-05)  (.000209)   
Tariff × log Chinese    -.00114 -.000147    -.00531*** -.000777 
    (.00118) (.000645)    (.00186) (.00116) 
Tariff × log Chinese × non-differentiated    3.53e-05*** 3.50e-06***    7.86e-05***  4.20e-06* 
    (9.54e-06) (1.31e-06)    (1.61e-05) (2.29e-06) 
Log Chinese × non-differentiated    -.000616*** -2.16e-05    -.00158*** .000131*** 
    (.000105) (2.11e-05)    (.000212) (3.64e-05) 
Obs. 88138  88138  88017  87728  87728  87606 
R2 0.051  0.052  .000  .086  .087  .001 




product  Partner  Partner 
Partner FE regressions are estimated through least square dummy variable (LSDV). Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are estimated 
taking “within” product deviations and adding partner dummies. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. “Non-differentiated” equals 1 if both the liberal and conservative classifications of Rauch (1999) indicate that the product 










  Table 10. The role of Chinese networks in tariff evasion in trading partners 
  missing import values  Missing import quantities 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tariff  -.000779    .0201***   -.0263***    .0272***  
  (.00209)    (.00304)   (.00570)   (.00628)  
Tariff × Chinese  .00155***  .00141***    .00278***  .000706***    
  (.000237)  (9.70e-05)    (.000568)  (.000156)    
Tariff × Chinese share     .000974***  -.00121***      .00377***  -.00059*** 
      (.000326) (.000101)     (.000718) (.000160) 
Tariff × corruption  -.00547* -.000760  .00701***  .00110  -.0141**  -.00827*  -.00608  -.00824** 
  (.00290)  (.00254) (.00260) (.00251) (.00637) (.00455) (.00570) (.00344) 
Tariff × corruption ×  .000897***  .000519**    .00128**  .000430    
Chinese  (.000267)  (.000251)    (.000627)  (.000453)    
Tariff × corruption ×     .000587**  3.77e-05      -.000876  -.000332 
Chinese share      (.000299) (.000342)     (.000728) (.000477) 
Obs.  252286  252185 248790 248687 246661 246559 243294 243190 
R2  0.076  0.083 0.076 0.083 0.123 0.161 0.120 0.157 
Fixed effects  partner  partner, 
product  partner  partner, 
product  partner  partner, 
product  partner  partner, 
product 
Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All partner FE regressions are estimated 
through LSDV. Regressions with partner and product fixed-effects are estimated taking “within” product deviations and adding partner dummies.
 
 
26 Table 11. Misreporting tests à la Fisman and Wei (2004) – partners 
   Missing imports values  Missing imports quantities 




(3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Tariff   .00718***  .00588***  .00161  .00561  -.00119  -.0121 
 (.00216)  (.00217)  (.00440)  (.00366)  (.00393)  (.00996) 
Tariff  Chinese      .00101**      .00186* 
     (.000490)      (.00105) 
Tariff × corruption     -.00861      -.0316** 
     (.00564)      (.0123) 
Tariff × Chinese ×     .00129**      .00318*** 
corruption     (.000558)      (.00119) 
            
Avg tariff on similar goods  .00579***  .00746***  -.00348  -.0151***  -.0128***  -.0391*** 
 (.00221)  (.00241)  (.00465)  (.00461)  (.00496)  (.0112) 
HS4 tariff spread    .00157 -.000415    .0223***  .0404*** 
    (.00145) (.00352)    (.00320)  (.00805) 
Avg tariff on similar goods ×     .000918*      .00284** 
Chinese     (.000524)      (.00115) 
          
Avg tariff on similar goods     .000443     .0139 
corruption     (.00580)      (.0132) 
           
Avg tariff on similar goods ×    -2.20e-05** 7.66e-05   
-8.13e-
05*** -7.07e-05 
HS4 tariff spread    (8.74e-06) (4.81e-05)    (2.20e-05)  (9.63e-05) 
           
HS4 tariff spread × Chinese     .000198      -.00175** 
     (.000367)      (.000776) 
HS4 tariff spread × corruption     .0118***      .0372*** 
     (.00379)      (.00840) 
Avg tariff on similar goods ×       -.000497      -.00148 
Chinese x corruption      (.000592)      (.00128) 
            
Avg tariff on similar goods ×       -1.31e-05***      -9.48e-06 
Chinese x  HS4 spread      (4.74e-06)      (8.71e-06) 
            
Avg tariff on similar goods ×      -2.77e-05**      -.000104*** 
corruption x HS4 spread      (1.29e-05)      (2.84e-05) 
            
Avg tariff on similar goods ×      -.00101***      -.00271*** 
corruption x HS4 




Obs. 225313  225313  223246  220273  220273  218371 
R2 .077  .077  .077  .120  .121  .122 
Partner fixed effects (LSDV) regressions. Standard errors clustered at the product level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level  
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Appendix. China's missing imports ($ '000) 
Partner  tariff >= 20%  tariff < 20% 
Albania   -4110.734 
Algeria 76.574  -96195.24 
Andorra   -9.046 
Argentina -2605.849  -655306.8 
Armenia   -334.638 
Australia -392227.6  -5748226 
Austria 29582.04  -238727.6 
Azerbaijan -480.763  74469.24 
Bahrain   -39718.72 
Bangladesh -103.872  -10210.86 
Barbados   -181.111 
Belarus -186.02  -67108.98 
Belgium -20287.91  -864737.3 
Belize   -205.036 
Benin -22485.9  -13015.15 
Bhutan   -1.631 
Bolivia -5.682  -13497.84 
Bosnia & Herz.  -10.947  -103250.2 
Botswana -0.212  -3712.411 
Brazil 20725.7  -3184573 
Bulgaria -245.177  -15374.35 
Burkina Faso  -163265.7  -0.741 
Burundi   -327.082 
Cameroon 8027.554  -10235.72 
Canada -164168  -1543406 
Chile -4653.809  -221658.5 
Colombia 629.784  30889.94 
Cook Islands    -3699.311 
Costa Rica  -49.341  -12957.66 
Cote d'Ivoire  3226.014  -8379.759 
Croatia -5.734  -39183.51 
Cuba -34783.92  -90459.88 
Cyprus -0.253  2988.119 
Czech Republic  -266.2538 -89216.77 
Denmark -4691.322  -247133 
Dominican Rep.  -8.448  -570.5634 
East Timor    -0.716 
Ecuador -37.026  -36100.38 
El Salvador  -8582.115  -218.961 
Estonia -426.589  -24704.75 
Ethiopia -0.106  -5486.268 
Fiji 64.204  -689.105 
Finland -15450.04  -815976.9 
France -36787  -1687879 
French Polynesia  889.338  1512.07 
Gabon 355.83  -150947.8 
Gambia, The    -170.378 
Georgia -6.18  2930.553 
Germany -243015.8  -5165026 
Ghana -901.375  -58820.33 
Greece -4471.771 6908.388 
Greenland   -28437.32 
Guatemala -32466.36  -26292.36 
Guinea -1017.198  -1962.435 
Guyana   -4002.209 
Honduras -1392.711  -2389.86 
Hong Kong,  -284300.5  -5094703 
Hungary 1492.123  15462.4 
Iceland -190.722  -23780.42 
India 28043.02  -2748456 
Indonesia -131905.3  -2522551 
Iran -8621.238  -5930898 
Ireland 377.934  -361715.6 
Israel -2536.81  -448151.8 
Italy 121586.2  -1183111 
Jamaica -1.035  -114753.3 
Japan -511396.9  -1.87E+07 
Jordan -6.947  -64324.05 
Kazakhstan 414.4912 -757668.7 
Kenya -2876.656  -1851.337 
Kiribati   -21.483 
Korea, Rep.  470351.7  -6985325 
Kyrgyz Republic  -1812.516  -59447.42 
Latvia 14.07799  2438.899 
Lebanon -1.644  20241.84 
Lithuania 633.614  -1939.478 
Luxembourg -3.874  -12196.54 
Macao -114.563 -232620.9 
Macedonia, FYR   -2814.449 
Madagascar -100.87  13645.48 
Malawi -1547.534  -519.719 
Malaysia 168006.9  -3218346 
Maldives -0.204  -17.472 
Mali -16708.06  -401.813 
Malta -6.49  15427.83 
Mauritania   -4057.233 
Mauritius -41.942  -7856.824 
Mexico 14355.18  -882656.3 
Moldova   -129.825 
Mongolia -88.99901  -79631.95 
Morocco -3581.217  -90120.44 
Mozambique 907.2878  -54323.05 
Namibia   -32944.64 
Netherlands 8853.254  -95332.53 
Neth. Antilles    -744.299 
New Caledonia    -16420.32 
New Zealand  1068.089  -259993.5 
Nicaragua -6850.385  -56.987 
Niger   -0.65 
Norway -86961.77  -284749.2 
Oman 98.84601  966823.2 
Pakistan -4664.338  -399268.1 
Panama -1.361  -12223.99 
Paraguay 13208.59  -5084.257 
Peru -619.82  -452541.2 
Philippines -145906.4  -1255521 
Poland -162.645  -51688.07 
Portugal 325.176  -196814 
Qatar -0.294  -116721.7 
Russia -68157.85  -4721156  
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Rwanda   -9388.952 
Samoa   -40.724 
Saudi Arabia  -45.627  -1535852 
Senegal -2270.448  -964.4841 
Seychelles   -9.776 
Singapore 32422.27  1646119 
Slovak Republic  -25346.35  -45539.16 
Slovenia -232.719  -23492.59 
South Africa  -7608.69  -1677722 
Spain -20905.93  -356613.6 
Sri Lanka  -2880.938  -8688.327 
St. Lucia    -61.141 
Sudan -2045.467  -2573009 
Sweden -126222.8  -634299.1 
Switzerland -14387.9  -534356.6 
Syria -2143.136  -239.541 
Taiwan -220792  -1.86E+07 
Tanzania -25091.74  -124946.6 
Thailand -112410.9  -3544930 
Togo -20319.44  -4353.386 
Trinidad&Tobago -0.016  -16382.13 
Tunisia -18043.63  -10316.74 
Turkey 164.9601  -219118.3 
Uganda -12388.62  -3355.782 
Ukraine -11217.65  -170150.2 
UAE 130.992  -1754829 
United Kingdom  -76137.48  -577421.4 
United States  -619410.6  -8285654 
Uruguay -217.0482  -53232.03 
Venezuela -5.021  -837606.4 
Vietnam 412276.4  -65957.01 
Yemen -38.59399  -665175 
Zambia -30950.12  -171495.8 
Zimbabwe 423.929  69641.24  
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Thick dashed lines give 90% confidence interval using product clustered s.e.
Thin dashed line is a kernel density estimate of ln(1+chinese).
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































stars indicate statistical significance at the 95% level
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